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The industry-academy relationship has many benefits, but it also has potential drawbacks, including potential conflicts of
interest (e.g., when the profit motives of a private company unduly influence academic responsibilities). To date, policies
intended to regulate or manage financial conflicts of interest appear to be unsatisfying and inadequate. The present
study examined predictors of the responses of academic scientists and clinicians to hypothetical situations in which
financial and other conflicts of interest may arise. Academic scientists and clinicians at five medical schools completed
an anonymous survey that included vignettes that posed a potential conflict of interest. Participants indicated the
likelihood that they would engage in specific actions to avoid conflicts of interest. Findings indicated that junior faculty
and those whose departments received more federal grant money were more likely to respond in ways that could create
conflicts of interest (p < 0.05). These results suggest that various sub-groups of faculty may require different approaches
to appropriately avoid or manage financial conflicts of interest. These findings may contribute to the development of
new policies that deal more effectively with conflicts of interest.

Introduction
It is widely accepted in the scientific and
medical community that conflicts of interest pose a major problem for scientific and
clinical integrity, and have the potential to
erode public trust in academic research.1-4
Conflicts of interest are defined as situations or circumstances in which secondary financial or other interests may either
influence or appear to influence professional actions or judgments.5 A secondary
interest may not be improper in and of
itself, but it can conflict with a primary
interest.6 An academic scientist or clinician may enter into a conflict of interest
when the economic motives of a private
funding source or another secondary
interest unduly influence his or her primary academic responsibilities.7,8 While
non-financial pressures such as promotion or recognition may create a conflict
of interest as indicated, for example, by
a biased reporting of results, the scientific process and institutional policies
tend to manage these types of conflicts
of interest.9 This study considers the nonfinancial pressures, but primarily focuses

on financial conflicts of interest, which
are, at present, not adequately governed by
institutional policies.
Conflicts of interest exist in academic
science, with reports that funding by private industry may include strings such as
control of the study design or statistical
analysis.10 Academic scientists face stressful pressures, including but not limited
to promotion, recognition by peers, pressure to publish, obtain funding and contribute to the public good by addressing
pain and suffering.9,11 These strong forces
can create conflicts, but they also serve
to incentivize biomedical discovery and
new treatments. These same pressures can
make academic scientists vulnerable to
financial conflicts of interest. Put differently, the need to fund studies to accomplish academic goals may create conflicts
when the for-profit motivations of private
funding sources place restrictions or pressures on academic scientists to behave in
certain ways in return for the funding. For
example, a pharmaceutical company may
offer to provide funding to an academic
scientist on the condition that the company must approve any manuscript prior

to submission. This creates a conflict of
interest for the academic scientist because
the pharmaceutical company’s economic
motives to control what is published in the
literature impact the scientist’s primary
motive to obtain funding for biomedical inquiry and discovery. Ultimately,
the strings attached to private funding
may hurt the public because experimental results may never be disseminated,
the results may be presented in a skewed
manner or doubt may be cast upon the
results of such studies.12 In addition, these
situations can impact scientific integrity.13
However, at the time of entering into the
agreement with the pharmaceutical company, the scientist may be primarily concerned with funding research and research
staff, and may not fully consider the
potential impact of allowing the for-profit
motives of the pharmaceutical company to
control the design of the study or dissemination of the results.
Another example of a financial conflict of interest in academic science concerns the tension between the academic
goal of publishing results as quickly as
possible and the private sector’s interest
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Table 1. Mean response by vignette type and academic rank
Vignette type

Assistant
M (SD)

Associate
M (SD)

Full
M (SD)

Pharmaceutical

0.9 (1.3)a

0.8 (1.1)a

0.6 (1.2)b

Profit

2.4 (1.6)

2.5 (1.6)

f

2.1 (1.7)i

Data reporting

1.3 (1.1)d

1.2 (1.2)g

0.9 (1.0)j

Promotion

3.3 (2.0)

3.0 (1.9)

2.1 (1.9)i

c

e

h

Note: For all vignette types, scores ranged from 0–9. Across rows (i.e., by academic rank) and
down columns (i.e., by vignette type within each rank), cells that share the same superscript were
not significantly different, p > 0.05.

in protecting results from disclosure for
intellectual property protection. For
example, a pharmaceutical company may
offer to fund research on drug discovery,
but require that the academic scientist not
publish any results until the company can
obtain intellectual property protection.14
This may mean that the publication of
results will be delayed for many years as
the private company works through a regulatory approval process. Concerns about
funding or promotion may, however, place
the scientist in a position to accept the private funding and its attendant strings.
Conflicts of interest exist at the clinical
level as well. It has been recognized that
even small gifts from pharmaceutical companies can unduly influence decisions by
medical students and physicians.15 Studies
have shown that payments per recruitment of each subject in a clinical trial may
create conflicts of interest.16 In addition,
financial conflicts of interest may arise if
an academic scientist in a clinical trial also
stands to gain financially from the outcome of the trial.9,17
Some argue that academic researchers are trained to be objective and therefore should not be influenced by money.18
While scientists are trained to be objective,
and there is the threat of reputational scars
for failures of objectivity, it would be naïve
to assume that universities do not require
appropriate financial conflict of interest
policies to address the recent increase of
problems associated with receiving funding from private sources or holding equity
in companies.
The rise of financial conflicts of interest appears to coincide with the passage
of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.19 One
outcome of the Bayh-Dole Act is that
academic institutions are allowed to patent discoveries developed from research
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supported by federal funding, giving the
institution the ability to license technology to the private sector.20 This change
in intellectual property rights spurred the
creation of Technology-Transfer offices at
universities.20 Universities created their
own policies regarding financial conflicts
of interest; however, the guidelines have
variability across institutions.1,21
The National Institutes of Health
(NIH) has policies addressing conflicts
of interest. Specifically, the NIH requires
that grant applicants disclose potential
conflicts of interest. Over the past 15
years, the NIH lowered the threshold
amount that must be disclosed.22,23
Reports in the scientific and medical
literature appear to agree that the myriad
policies currently in place at universities and in government are not adequate
to address the serious issue of conflicts
of interest.5 Due to the complexity of the
problem, universities and the government
struggle to properly regulate this area.5
One approach to moving toward an
effective policy is to study how academic
scientists might behave as they enter into
arrangements that may create conflicts of
interest. In this way, policymakers can
attempt to create policies that incentivize
certain behaviors deemed positive and disincentivize behaviors that are deemed negative.24 An understanding of how scientists
respond to situations in which a conflict
of interest might arise could be important
to develop policies that effectively address
conflicts of interest. To this end, the present study surveyed academic scientists
and assessed their responses to hypothetical situations posing a potential conflict
of interest. The following questions were
addressed: (1) whether junior faculty may
respond differently than senior faculty to
questions raising a potential conflict of
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interest because junior faculty may be less
experienced and may be more susceptible
to the increased pressure to be productive;
(2) whether faculty with primary research
responsibilities may respond differently
than faculty with primary clinical duties;
and (3) whether responses were related to
federal grant money per faculty in respondents home departments. The present
study is complementary to other studies
that analyze the extent of different types
of relationships between academia and
industry.6,25,26 An improved understanding of how academic scientists respond
to situations in which a conflict of interest may arise may identify areas in which
appropriate policy incentives can be used
to minimize conflicts of interest.
Results
Invitations to complete a conflict-ofinterest survey consisting of seven
vignettes were sent to 6,357 candidates
via e-mail. The invitation included a
brief description of the survey and a link
to the survey itself (survey available from
the first author). Of the 6,357 invitations
sent, 464 (7.3%) were either returned as
undeliverable or received an “out of office”
response, leaving a total of 5,893 potential
participants. A total of 603 (10.2%) faculty members responded to the survey. In
terms of academic rank, 138 (22.9%) were
assistant, 149 (24.7%) associate and 306
(50.7%) full professors. In terms of specialty, 262 (43.4%) reported their home
department as medicine, family medicine,
pediatrics or emergency; 196 (32.5%)
as a medical specialty department (e.g.,
dermatology, neurology); 62 (10.3%) as
psychiatry or psychology; 49 (8.1%) as a
physical science department (e.g., biology,
biochemistry); 21 (3.5%) as a social science department (e.g., epidemiology); and
13 (2.2%) as pharmacy. In terms of 2009
federal grant money received per department faculty member, the mean was $0.11
million (SD = 0.15, range 0–0.93).
Tobit analyses. Vignettes were sorted
into four categories (pharmaceutical, data,
profit and promotion) and responses were
recoded so that zero was the response that
would be least likely to lead to a conflict of
interest. We used tobit regression models
to separately test whether mean responses
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Table 2. Tobit regression models of vignette responses
Vignette type
Pharmaceutical

Predictor

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t-test

Rank

-0.55

0.08

-7.14**

Department grants

1.37

0.45

3.05**

Sector

-0.26

0.21

-1.24

Rank

-0.42

0.7

5.60**

Department grants

0.97

0.42

2.31*

Sector

-0.20

0.12

-1.71

Rank

-0.32

0.12

2.51*

Department grants

1.13

0.43

2.64**

Sector

-0.39

0.16

-2.39*

Data

Profit

Promotion

Rank

-0.49

0.12

3.97**

Department grants

-0.07

0.65

-0.11

Sector

-0.24

0.20

-1.17

*p < 0.05; **p<0.01

to each vignette category differed by academic rank, academic sector (clinical vs.
research) and home department federal
grant money per faculty. Mean ratings
by rank and vignette type are shown in
Table 1. The pattern of means suggested
that full professors differed from other
faculty; consequently, we dichotomized
rank into full vs. less than full. Results of
the four tobit models are shown in Table
2. We then used the procedure described
by Roncek to derive from each coefficient
a value reflecting the change in outcomes
with a change in the predictor variable
for those with responses greater than
zero, and a value reflecting the effect of
the predictor on the probability of a zero
response.27
The tobit coefficients for academic
rank were negative and significant in each
model, meaning that full professors gave
significantly lower (i.e., more appropriate) responses to each vignette type. Full
professors were approximately 11% more
likely to give a zero response than their
more junior colleagues on the pharmaceutical and data vignettes, and 3 and 5%
more likely on the profit and promotion
vignettes. Of those who gave non-zero
responses, full professors gave responses
that were 0.20 points lower than other
faculty on the pharmaceutical vignettes,
0.22 points lower on the data and profit
vignettes and 0.31 points lower on the
promotion vignettes.
The effect of departmental grant
money per faculty was significant and
positive for the pharmaceutical, data and
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profit vignettes. That is, respondents
whose departments received more federal
grant money in 2009 tended to give significantly higher (i.e., less appropriate)
responses to these hypothetical situations.
A one-unit increase in departmental grant
money (i.e., an additional $1 million per
faculty) was associated with a 0.5 point
increase in scores on the pharmaceutical and data vignettes, and a 0.8 point
increase on the profit vignettes. The same
one-unit increase in departmental grant
money was associated with a 26% increase
in the probability of non-zero responses
for the pharmaceutical vignettes, 24% for
the data vignettes and 12% for the profit
vignettes. Departmental grant money was
not significantly associated with responses
to the promotion vignettes.
Academic sector did not predict
responses to the pharmaceutical, data or
promotion vignettes. There was a significant effect on the profit vignettes, such
that non-zero responses from clinicians
were about 0.3 points lower than non-zero
responses from researchers. Additionally,
clinicians were about 4% less likely to
give non-zero responses compared to
researchers.
Discussion
This study investigated the responses of
medical school faculty to vignettes where
conflicts of interest may arise. For all
four vignette types, we found that full
professors were significantly more likely
than assistant and associate professors to
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respond in a way that would minimize
the possibility of a conflict of interest. In
addition, with the exception of promotion
-related vignettes, we found that respondents whose home departments received
more federal grant money per faculty were
more likely to respond in ways that would
increase the probability of a conflict of
interest.
Interestingly,
participants’
mean
responses varied depending on the type of
vignette. For example, the mean response
to vignettes concerning promotion was
higher (i.e., less appropriate) than to the
vignettes concerning pharmaceuticals
(Table 1). The vignettes used to analyze
these two categories were not overlapping.
This opens the possibilities to a number
of explanations: (1) conflicts concerning
pharmaceuticals are more obvious to faculty; (2) institutional policies address nonfinancial conflicts of interest better than
financial conflicts of interest or (3) the
vignette itself did not present as obvious a
conclusion. In any event, the difference in
the mean response may be useful in crafting an effective pre-intervention policy
that governs conflicts of interest.
The difference in responses may provide
important insight into the need for consistent and effective conflict of interest policies. That is, the differences in responses
suggest that new or revised policies may
be needed. Current approaches to addressing conflicts of interest may not account
for differences in faculty rank, position
or responsibilities.28 Further, many financial conflict of interest policies focus on
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disclosure after a conflict comes into existence (e.g., that a gene therapy has been
patented by a private company with which
the academic scientist is involved).13,21
The purpose for the disclosure requirement appears to be that an independent
body may then be appointed or consulted
to determine whether steps can be taken
to manage the academic scientist’s conflict
of interest.1,29 The disclosure approach
may be inadequate because of the difficulties associated with evaluating each
scenario from an ex ante perspective to
determine if a financial conflict of interest should be addressed such that no harm
could ever occur. Given that issues with
conflicts of interest continue to arise in
academic medicine and lead to reported
harms, the current policies appear ineffective or inadequate.
This study may prove helpful in drafting new conflict of interest policies.
Policy shapes human behavior and can be
directed towards incentivizing academic
scientists to respond in a particular way
when faced with a potential conflict of
interest. The present study may be helpful
in the following ways. First, it is of great
interest that junior faculty (i.e., associate
or assistant professors) responded differently to situations concerning a conflict of
interest hypothetical than senior faculty
(i.e., full professors). While both junior
and senior faculty should be governed
by the same high level conflict of interest
policies; junior faculty, who are less experienced and may face different pressures,
may need targeted education programs or
other types of oversight in order to assist
them in recognizing when a conflict of
interest may be present and in dealing
effectively with potential conflicts. The
design of an education or training program could be based on other studies
that analyze ethics training and decisionmaking, and follow-up studies that analyze the effectiveness of training programs
should be performed.30
Second, our survey results suggest
that faculty in departments with larger
amounts of grant money may respond
differently than faculty with smaller
amounts of department grant money, suggesting that the amount of grant money
in a department may contribute to a
culture of attitudes towards conflicts of
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interest. That is, faculty who are heavily
dependent on grant money may have different pressures on them than faculty that
are not as dependent on large amounts of
grant money.
Third, although the study was not
explicitly designed to address differences
between researchers and clinicians, the
data indicated that these groups may differ, and may therefore require different
policies to address the conflicts they may
face. A previous study by Campbell and
colleagues found that clinical departments
have more relationships with industry
compared to nonclinical departments.25
This suggests that both the amount and
type of private funding may be important
factors for consideration when crafting
conflict of interest policies. Overall, this
study exemplifies that work must be done
in the area of conflicts of interest because
not all faculty respond the same way when
faced with a situation in which a conflict
may arise.
Our study is not without limitations.
First, we used a small number of vignettes
in an attempt to understand a much larger
topic that has many facets. The rationale
for using seven vignettes was to create a
less burdensome survey in an effort to
obtain a larger number of responses. An
onerous survey that is more time consuming may provide comprehensive results,
but it also comes with its own limitations (e.g., fewer respondents). Second,
it is possible that some respondents did
not answer honestly, potentially biasing the findings. However, the relatively
large sample and anonymous nature of
the survey likely minimized this possibility. Third, the brief survey did not assess
a number of other factors that are likely to
influence responses, including the extent
to which participants have received public
and private funding, clinical vs. research
duties and experience with conflicts of
interest. Finally, although respondents
were from five different medical schools,
all five are part of the same state university system and may have similar policies
and training requirements, potentially
reducing generalizability outside of this
system.
Importantly, an understanding of how
academic scientists respond to situations
in which a conflict of interest might arise
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may assist in the creation of new and effective policies to address conflicts of interest.
The law—which effectively shapes human
behavior—can be utilized to create incentives for positive behavior and create disincentives for negative behavior in order
to craft an effective policy that addresses
faculty behavior before a conflict of interest arises.24
Materials and Methods
Study design and sample. Participants
were recruited in August and September
2010 from five medical schools at state
universities in the southwestern United
States. All five are members of the same
state university system. Potential participants were identified from medical school
faculty listings on publicly available university websites. Due to participants’ anonymity, this study was certified as exempt
from IRB review by IRBs at participants’
institutions.
Survey instrument. After reporting
their institution, home department, rank
and academic track and primary sector
(research or clinical), participants read
seven vignettes describing situations in
which a conflict of interest could arise in
academic research. The vignettes reflected
potential conflicts with pharmaceutical
study sponsors, private investors and university administration. Participants rated
their most likely response to each situation
on a scale from 0–9.
Data analysis. We hypothesized that
mean vignette responses would differ
by academic rank and academic sector.
We also expected response differences
based on 2009 federal grant money per
faculty member of respondents’ home
departments (retrieved from www.
report.nih.gov/funded_organizations/
index.aspx). We sorted the vignettes
into four non-mutually-exclusive categories: conflicts with pharmaceutical
companies (vignettes 1 and 4), reporting
of data (vignettes 1, 3, 4 and 5), scientific vs. profit motive (vignettes 2, 5 and
6) and promotion (vignettes 3 and 7).
Vignettes falling into each category were
averaged to create category scores that
were used as outcome variables, and the
effects of rank, sector and departmental
grant money were tested separately for
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each category. The three predictor variables were tested simultaneously in each
model. All responses were recoded so
that higher scores reflected less appropriate responses. All analyses used an alpha
level of. 05 and were conducted with
Intercooled Stata 11.0.
The distributions of each outcome
variable were positively skewed, and in
each case zero was the modal score; that is,
there was a floor effect such that the data
were left-censored at zero. Consequently,
we used tobit regression to model these
outcomes. The tobit procedure models
the effect of predictor variables on underlying latent variables31-33 (here, responses
to the vignette categories), addressing the
presence of floor or ceiling effects. We
then decomposed the tobit coefficients
into two effects: (1) the expected effect
of a predictor (e.g., academic rank) on
vignette responses for respondents with
non-zero values; and (2) the effect of the
predictor on the probability of a non-zero
response.27,33
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